Boeing checklist philosophy

To improve your visit to our site, take a minute and upgrade your browser. Mostly he worried about shriveling market share driving sales and head count into the ground, the things that keep post-industrial American labor leaders up at night. On some level, though, he saw it all coming; he even demonstrated how the costs of a grounded plane would dwarf the short-term savings achieved from the latest outsourcing binge in one of his reports that no one read back in They also inherited a notoriously dysfunctional product line from the corner-cutting market gurus at McDonnell.

Checklist Philosophy & Planning

The premise behind this complaining was silly, Sorscher contended in PowerPoint presentations and a Harvard Business School-style case study on the topic. But when he brought that message on the road, he rarely elicited much more than an eye roll. Occasionally, though, someone in the audience was outright mean, like the Wall Street analyst who cut him off mid-sentence:. And indeed, that would appear to be the real moral of this story: Airplane manufacturing is no different from mortgage lending or insulin distribution or make-believe blood analyzing software—another cash cow for the one percent, bound inexorably for the slaughterhouse.

In the now infamous debacle of the Boeing MAX, the company produced a plane outfitted with a half-assed bit of software programmed to override all pilot input and nosedive when a little vane on the side of the fuselage told it the nose was pitching up.

boeing checklist philosophy

The vane was also not terribly reliablepossibly due to assembly line lapses reported by a whistle-blowerand when the plane processed the bad data it received, it promptly dove into the sea. Boeing was not, of course, a hedge fund: It was way better, a stock that had more than doubled since the Trump inauguration, outperforming the Dow in the 22 months before Lion Air plunged into the Java Sea.

Down in South Carolina, a nonunion Boeing assembly line that opened in had for years churned out scores of whistle-blower complaints and wrongful termination lawsuits packed with scenes wherein quality-control documents were regularly forged, employees who enforced standards were sabotaged, and planes were routinely delivered to airlines with loose screws, scratched windows, and random debris everywhere.

The story of the secrecy begins with the universally beloved, unusually labor-friendly, strangely not-evil Southwest Airlines. On something of a lark, Boeing had given Kelleher a sweet no-money-down deal on his first four s inand Kelleher repaid the favor by buying more than 1, s over the next 50 years—and zero of any other plane. Those partnerships were but one numbers-smoothing mechanism in a diversified tool kit Boeing had assembled over the previous generation for making its complex and volatile business more palatable to Wall Street, and while not entirely kosher and not at all sustainable, they were by far the least destructive tool in the kit—until Southwest called in the favor on its orders for the MAX.

To whoever agreed to this, the rebate probably seemed like a predictably quixotic demand of the airline that had quixotically chosen to fly just one plane model, exclusively and eternally, where every other airline flew ten. But the No Sim Edict would haunt the program; it basically required any change significant enough for designers to worry about to be concealed, suppressed, or relegated to a footnote that would then be redacted from the final version of the MAX.

The planes were also considerably longer, heavier, and wider of wingspan. The engines were too big to tuck into their original spot underneath the wings, so engineers mounted them slightly forward, just in front of the wings.

Once the MAX materialized as a real-life plane about four years later, however, test pilots discovered new realms in which the plane was more stall-prone than its predecessors. That involved giving the system more power and removing a safeguard, but not, in any formal or genuine way, running its modifications by the FAA, which might have had reservations with two critical traits of the revamped system: Firstly, that there are two AOA sensors on abut only one, fatefully, was programmed to trigger MCAS.

Whatever that contingency, it would have involved some kind of cockpit alert, which would in turn have required additional training—probably not level-D training, but no one wanted to risk that.I used to think the only argument worth having when it comes to checklist philosophy was the "challenge-do-verify" CDV versus the "do-verify" DV debate.

Many pilots think it is perfectly fine to do everything from memory and then use the checklist to make sure nothing was forgotten. So we'll show how that debate is more settled than many think.

Some pilots willfully skip doing checklists entirely. They just "do" D.

boeing checklist philosophy

So that brings up an even more fundamental question: Are Checklists Required? And skipping using a CDV checklist in this aircraft would have saved at least 7 lives on May 31, Everything here is from the references shown below, with a few comments in an alternate color. Williams, the Model was the prototype for 12, Bs which followed. Then on Oct. The tragic event seemed certain to lead to the cancellation of the program and an immediate change in Army Air Corps planning.

At about a. Ployer P. Donald L. Also on board were John B. Cutting, a flight-test observer; Mark H. Koogler, also from the Flying Branch; and Tower. Two men, 1st Lt. Robert K. Giovannoli and 1st Lt.

Boeing NON NORMAL CK LIST philosophy

Leonard F. Harman, sensed it was in trouble and ran forward as the airplane reached an altitude of about feet. The Model stalled, turned degrees, and fell back onto a field. It landed on its left wing, cushioning the impact, which probably saved the lives of several crew.

Lying flat on the field, the bomber burst into flames. Amazingly, four crew members were able to crawl from the blazing wreckage. A board of officers convened at Wright Field to investigate the crash. The presiding officer was Lt. Frank D. Instead, it ascribed the direct cause to the elevator control being locked. The tail section of the aircraft was virtually all that survived the fire, but it contained the cause of the accident: an internal control lock that controlled both the elevator and rudder.

The board stated that—due to the size of the airplane and the inherent design of the control system—it was improbable that any pilot, taking off under the same conditions, would discover the locked controls until it was too late to prevent a crash.

Ordinarily, pilots make checks of their movement as a precaution, but apparently this did not occur. To avoid another accident, Air Corps personnel developed checklists the crew would follow for takeoff, flight, before landing, and after landing.

The idea was so simple, and so effective, that the checklist was to become the future norm for aircraft operations. The basic concept had already been around for decades, and was in scattered use in aviation worldwide, but it took the Model crash to institutionalize its use.

The creation of the checklist was delayed by an unrealistic reliance on the memory of pilots. Five items were devoted to actions to take before takeoff, nine covered in-flight procedures and safety precautions, two advised on landings, and two discussed ways to avoid stalls and spins. As was the case with all of these checklist predecessors, pilots were expected to know the manual by rote.All rights reserved.

Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use. Login with Facebook. Remember Me? By logging into your account, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policyand to the use of cookies as described therein. Mark Forums Read. Tech Log The very best in practical technical discussion on the web. Thread Tools.

What's the standard in your company? Do you really perform the Landing ck list in the "One engine inop landing" non-normal cklist as a DO list? How is it managed exactly? View Public Profile. Off course you will put the landing gear down and select flaps according to the company's SOPs. Hope this helped. Find More Posts by E Thanks, E, but that was my point: if Quote:. LEM, if you are confronted with an abnormal flight situation that requires reference to the QRH, the particular drill necessary is clearly spelt out in the correct chronological sequence.

Some abnormals are memory items that are carried out from memory as soon as that chcklist is called for. The Flight Manual expands on the reasons and finer points of the required actions and we study both. I am still amazed at the questions you pose on this forum and wonder what kind of training you have undergone to get your command?

Just tell us what type you are operating, it will be easier to supply the answers. Find More Posts by HotDog. As E says, the items are should be! I cannot see the issue, I'm afraid. For the other parts of the NN checklists, PNF 'declares' the item and PF nods, grunts or waves whatever is spare at the time as an acknowledgement. HD, you have obviously flown all your life?

I've never been in a major, and changed already almost ten companies: that means I've met a lot of different people from various countries. Don't worry I manage very well my command, and if I ask strange questions here is because sometimes I recall some strange?

BOAC, in this case I use good common sense as you do. But I once had an instructor very picky on the DO principle:according to that, you don't do anything by recall or SOP, but you have to read first and then lower the gear! This is obviously an exageration, but I was curious to know if there are other people around the world who think the same. Just that. HD this is a forum, perhaps the only place where we can still ask dumbass questions also.

You seem to miss the real world too much. LEM : How interesting that you have worked for so many companies!!!! Suggestions chaps LEM, I am impressed! Almost ten companies, that must be somewhat of a record.Whether you're new to Appcues, or a seasoned veteran, you're probably curious about a few things.

Whats the best way to setup a successful onboarding experience? How can your users keep track of their progress? Should it be hands-on or hands-off, or somewhere in-between? With our Checklist, we've looked back at our experience of watching our customers build hundreds of onboarding flows for their products, and designed something that's predictable, delightful, and effective for helping users learn any product.

Check out our checklist pro webinar here! In software, the checklist patten has been used for new-user onboarding in various forms for many years, the most famous example being LinkedIn's motivational meter for "completing your profile.

Checklist Philosophy

There are a few things you should do to ensure you're ready to setup a successful Checklist experience:. To help you plan, we've put together the following exercise you can complete with your team. We recommend the Appcues onboarding owner collaborate with a designer, an engineer, and perhaps someone from a supporting role, such as customer success or support, who may have insight into the customer experience leading to a successful start. If you have a good idea of the steps required in your product, you can skip this step.

Launch the Checklist Worksheet. Upload file.View Full Version : Boeing checklist policy - Confusing or is it just progress? The revised Boeing checklist policy has the first officer conducting the majority of pre-flight, before start and before taxi checks. The long established challenge and response policy where one pilot reads the checklist and the other pilot answers responds has been discarded in favour of one pilot reading and answering himself.

It means that if the pilot challenging himself and answering himself inadvertently misses one line of the checklist the error may go unnoticed by the other crew member. I wonder why Boeing threw out a perfectly satisfactory checklist policy that served pilots well from the first Boeings and replaced it with a checklist policy that seems to contradict the basic premise that one pilot challenged and the other pilot observed and responded appropriately.

I subscribe to the adage "If it ain't broke - don't fix it. I think it's company specific. For us the preflight, before start, before taxi and before takeoff are all challenge and response. In the air, the after takeoff, descent and approach are read and do with a challenge and response for any altimeter checks Landing, shutdown and secure are challenge and response. Tee emms right.

✈ Boeing 737 COLD and DARK startup ✈ REAL AIRCRAFT!!

In the intro to the QRH Boeing details the way the checklists are to be used. My company has modified this back to the old way. It works fine. Critical items inevitably get double checked. Boeing know how to have procedures to operate their aeroplanes working well. Works ok. So, double checkfor all items. Reports from one local airline using the Boeing system reveals in many cases by sticking strictly to the Boeing philosophy the first officer reads challenges and answers responds to the preflight and before and after start checklists where he does most of the actions anyway, while the captain who has little to do looks out of his window at the view outside until he hears a challenge that warrants his response.

What a huge change from original Boeing philosophy of one challenges and the other responds. It's called progress? TEboeing says that BOTH crew members are required to verify all items, and the one responsible for item position will also answer the call. The captain should not look out on the window, he should follow the check flow, and answer when required.

He should also aknowledge that he verified each item. It is a progress,but you should do the checks properly. During taxi an engine fire warning occurs. In the Boeing system does the captain or the first officer close down the engine and who pulls the fire switch and fires the bottle? Let's say it is a severe fire and the captain decides to go ahead with a passenger evacuation. Again, which of the two pilots actually closes the remaining start lever and pulls the fire switches.Download full paper.

Incorporating checklists in high-hazard environments has been one of the most influential innovations to enhance safety in recent times. The Army Air Corps was to award a contract to build its next-generation long-range bomber, and three companies were bidding for the contract: the Douglas Aircraft Co.

Martin Co. The flew farther and faster, and it carried more payload than either of the other two entries. It was acknowledged that the advanced, sophisticated Boeing four-engine airplane was the inevitable winner. On Oct. An investigation determined that pilot error caused the crash. Boeing initially lost the contract, but some remained convinced that the aircraft could be safely operated.

A group of Boeing engineers and test pilots developed a simple approach: They created a pilot's checklist with critical action checks for taxi, takeoff and landing. A technicality in the selection process allowed Boeing to build and test another 12 Model aircraft. With the checklist in hand, Boeing and Air Corps pilots went on to fly the initial 12 airplanes a total of 1.

The Army ultimately ordered almost 13, of the aircraft, which were designated the B and gave the Allies an air advantage in World War II as they helped carry out a devastating bombing campaign across Nazi Germany.

The checklist became a permanent and mandatory tool, for both routine and emergency conditions, to be used by all pilots in the Boeing fleet, in all of military aviation, and soon after in commercial aviation as well.

boeing checklist philosophy

This paper examines the use of checklists in various high-risk environments, and pre- and post-checklist implementation comparisons. We will also discuss human factors studies that form the foundation for the use of checklists, as well as draw parallels between what implementation teams in other fields have discovered when integrating checklists and the positive impact checklists can have on safety.

The issues examined and conclusions documented can be used to support the development of critical checklists throughout any industrial application. Each of these different uses has a particular purpose, and each has value and meaning as intended. Our primary focus in this paper is to examine the effectiveness of prevention checklists in these industries.

For example, in only the last two decades has the medical industry adopted a serious stance in preventing surgical errors by widespread adoption of using checklists. In response to a shocking study published in that reported an estimated 44, Americans died each year as a result of preventable medical errors, a medical team at Johns Hopkins Hospital introduced several improvements, included and guided by a checklist termed the Comprehensive Unit Based Safety Program.

The program resulted in reducing what is known as central-line associated bloodstream infection, a life-threatening condition, to nearly zero over four years. The Johns Hopkins results has led other medical institutions to implement similar patient safety programs. Additionally, inwhen the World Health Organization deployed its Surgical Safety Checklist program, various health care systems, cultures and operating venues reported a 53 percent reduction in postoperative mortality and a 64 percent reduction in in morbidity.

The following implications, drawn from this analysis of processes under-taken to build a safety culture and in the use of checklists in numerous industries, provides insightful principles and practical strategies on how the development of critical checklists can have a positive impact on the development of a safety culture:.

The use of checklists will not eliminate all accidents in the lab, test facility, production line or wherever they are implemented. Accidents will still happen even when users make decisions consistent with best practices because risk cannot be completely eliminated. Training classes and feedback can positively change personal behavior. Practical issues encountered during the implementation of checklists can be minimized by effective training.

All employees must make decisions as to what steps, if any, they need to take based on a mental representation of the factors known or hypothesized in the ever-changing or semi-constant state of their equip-ment at any given point in time.

Internalization and generalization is central to the process of change. A change in communication can get people talking about safety differently than they communicated before an effective safety awareness program was implemented. Emphasis must be placed on the importance of checklist use with reminders of situations where deviations from checklists occur and how they can be misused.

Engaged senior leadership is essential to sustaining a culture of safety and the involvement of all levels of staff is critical to a successful safety and checklist initiative rollout. Checklists to Enhance Safety. Summary By Daniel J. Boorman William Y. The defining moment leading to the innovation of using a formal checklist occurred in Preparation checklists: Multiple-step situations require checklists to ensure all variables are performed as desired; for example, shopping lists, trip planning, and group or individual communication sessions.The purposes of an airplane checklist are to 1 help the pilot and copilot ensure that the airplane is configured correctly before each phase of flight and 2 facilitate the management of nonnormal conditions.

The use of a checklist has been essential in standardizing aircrew procedures. InBoeing will introduce the world's first airline-modifiable electronic checklist system on the Boeing flight deck. Its design specifically addresses many traditional paper checklist problems associated with crew errors. Directed by airline design requirements, Boeing used a consistent, pilot-oriented flight deck philosophy to address the pilot interface, system functionality, and automation tradeoff questions.

Subscribers can view annotate, and download all of SAE's content. Avionics Flight Systems for the 21st Century. View Details. Browse Publications Technical Papers Citation: McKenzie, W. Download Citation. Author s : William A. McKenzie, Martin C. Affiliated: Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. Event: Aerospace Technology Conference and Exposition. Related Topics: Aircraft operations Standardization.

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